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How Inflation Swindles the Equity Investor
通货膨胀是如何欺骗股票投资者的 The central problem in the stock market is that the return on capital hasn′t risen with inflation. It seems to be stuck at 12 percent.
股票市场的核心问题是，总体净资产收益率并没有随着通货膨胀而上升，似乎这一比例保持在了12%。
（译者注：在会计学中，capital是指资产净值，一般人把return on capital翻译成资本回报率，这容易引起混淆。从下面的文章中可以看出，巴菲特所说的return on capital是指股市总体的净资产收益率。） by Warren E. Buffett, FORTUNE May 1977
作者：沃伦•巴菲特，《财富》杂志1977年5月号 It is no longer a secret that stocks, like bonds, do poorly in an inflationary environment. We have been in such an environment for most of the past decade, and it has indeed been a time of troubles for stocks. But the reasons for the stock market's problems in this period are still imperfectly understood.
股票在通胀环境下像债券一样表现很差，这早已不是什么秘密。过去十年中(六七十年代)，我们大多数时间都处在通胀环境中。对股票而言，这确实是一个麻烦的时期。但是，在这段时间里造成股票市场表现很差的原因仍然没有被人们完全理解。 There is no mystery at all about the problems of bondholders in an era of inflation. When the value of the dollar deteriorates month after month, a security with income and principal payments denominated in those dollars isn't going to be a big winner. You hardly need a Ph.D. in economics to figure that one out.
在通胀时期债券持有人所面临的问题丝毫不难理解。当美元月复一月地贬值，一种收入和本金都用美元支付的证券将不会成为大赢家。你根本不需要一个博士学位就能搞懂这个问题。 It was long assumed that stocks were something else. For many years, the conventional wisdom insisted that stocks were a hedge against inflation. The proposition was rooted in the fact that stocks are not claims against dollars, as bonds are, but represent ownership of companies with productive facilities. These, investors believed, would retain their Value in real terms, let the politicians print money as they might.
一直以来，人们认为股票是不同于债券的。多年来，传统智慧坚持认为股票可以对冲通胀风险。这个说法来源于一个事实，那就是股票不像债券一样是对美元的所有权，而是对具有生产设施的公司的所有权。这些投资者认为，不管政客如何印钱，公司将保留其实质价值。 And why didn't it turn but that way? The main reason, I believe, is that stocks, in economic substance, are really very similar to bonds.
但是，为何事与愿违呢?我认为主要原因是，就经济本质而言，股票非常类似于债券。 I know that this belief will seem eccentric to many investors. Thay will immediately observe that the return on a bond (the coupon) is fixed, while the return on an equity investment (the company's earnings) can vary substantially from one year to another. True enough. But anyone who examines the aggregate returns that have been earned by companies during the postwar years will discover something extraordinary: the returns on equity have in fact not varied much at all.
我知道，对许多投资者而言，这一观点听起来有些古怪。他们会马上观察到债券的回报（利息）是固定的，而股票投资的回报（公司利润）每年可以大幅改变。这确实是事实。但是，任何研究二战后公司总体回报的人都会发现一个奇怪现象：总体净资产收益率事实上变化不大。
注意：这里的the returns on equity是指总体的净资产收益率，不是指单个股票。单个股票的净资产收益率一般变化较大。
The coupon is sticky
稳定的“股票利率”
In the first ten years after the war - the decade ending in 1955 - the Dow Jones industrials had an average annual return on year-end equity of 12.8 percent. In the second decade, the figure was 10.1 percent. In the third decade it was 10.9 percent. Data for a larger universe, the FORTUNE 500 (whose history goes back only to the mid-1950's), indicate somewhat similar results: 11.2 percent in the decade ending in 1965, 11.8 percent in the decade through 1975. The figures for a few exceptional years have been substantially higher (the high for the 500 was 14.1 percent in 1974) or lower (9.5 percent in 1958 and 1970), but over the years, and in the aggregate, the return on book value tends to keep coming back to a level around 12 percent. It shows no signs of exceeding that level significantly in inflationary years (or in years of stable prices, for that matter).
二战后第一个十年中(1946～1955)，道琼斯工业指数每年年底的净资产收益率平均为12.8%。第二个十年中，这一数字是10.1%。第三个十年是10.9%。财富500强（历史数据最早到50年代中期），这一个更大范围的数据显示了相似的结果：1955～1965年是11.2%，1965～1975是11.8%。这个数字在几个特殊年份里非常高（财富500强的最高值是1974年的14.1%）或者非常低（1958年和1970年的9.5%）。但是，过去这些年，总体而言，净资产收益率趋向于回到12%这一水平。在通胀年份里，没有迹象显示净资产收益率大幅超过这一水平（在物价稳定的年份里也同样如此）。
For the moment, let's think of those companies, not as listed stocks, but as productive enterprises. Let's also assume that the owners of those enterprises had acquired them at book value. In that case, their own return would have been around 12 percent too. And because the return has been so consistent, it seems reasonable to think of it as an "equity coupon".
现在，让我们先不把这些公司看成上市的股票，而是生产的企业。假设企业的所有者按净资产购买了这些企业。那么，这些企业的所有者的回报率也将是大约12%。由于回报率如此固定，我们有理由把它看成“股票利率”。
In the real world, of course, investors in stocks don't just buy and hold. Instead, many try to outwit their fellow investors in order to maximize their own proportions of corporate earnings. This thrashing about, obviously fruitless in aggregate, has no impact on the equity, coupon but reduces the investor's portion of it, because he incurs substantial frictional costs, such as advisory fees and brokerage charges. Throw in an active options market, which adds nothing to, the productivity of American enterprise but requires a cast of thousands to man the casino, and frictional costs rise further.
当然，在现实世界里，股票投资者并不只是购买并持有。相反，很多人试图以智取胜其它投资者，以便最大限度地扩大自己的企业盈利比例。这种行为，从总体上来说是无效的，对股票的息票没有任何影响，却降低了投资者的收益，因为它会带来大量的摩擦成本，如顾问费和佣金。再加上活跃的期权市场，这个对美国企业生产力亳无帮助但却需要成千上万人参与的赌场，其摩擦成本进一步上升。
Stocks are perpetual
股票是永久性的
It is also true that in the real world investors in stocks don't usually get to buy at book value. Sometimes they have been able to buy in below book; usually, however, they've had to pay more than book, and when that happens there is further pressure on that 12 percent. I'll talk more about these relationships later. Meanwhile, let's focus on the main point: as inflation has increased, the return on equity capital has not. Essentially, those who buy equities receive securities with an underlying fixed return - just like those who buy bonds.
在现实世界中，一个确定的事实是，股票投资者通常无法按净资产值购买股票。有时他们能够以低于净资产的价格买入，不过，通常而言，他们只能溢价买入，这种情况发生时，12%的回报面临的压力就更大了。在后面的文章里我会进一步谈二者的关系。现在，让我们关注主要的一点：通货膨胀已经增加，但净资产收益率不变。从本质上讲，买入股票得到的是具有内在固定回报率的证券，这和买入债券是一样的。
Of course, there are some important differences between the bond and stock forms. For openers, bonds eventually come due. It may require a long wait, but eventually the bond investor gets to renegotiate the terms of his contract. If current and prospective rates of inflation make his old coupon look inadequate, he can refuse to play further unless coupons currently being offered rekindle his interest. Something of this sort has been going on in recent years.
当然，债券和股票的形式有重大区别。首先，债券终将到期，这可能需要一个漫长的等待，但债券持有人终会等到重新谈判合同条款的那一天。如果当前及预期通胀使得以前的债券利率显得不够的话，他可以拒绝再买。除非提高当前债券的利率，重新燃起他的兴趣。近几年，这种情况一直在持续上演。 Stocks, on the other hand, are perpetual. They have a maturity date of infinity. Investors in stocks are stuck with whatever return corporate America happens to earn. If corporate America is destined to earn 12 percent, then that is the level investors must learn to live with. As a group, stock investors can neither opt out nor renegotiate. In the aggregate, their commitment is actually increasing. Individual companies can be sold or liquidated and corporations can repurchase their own shares; on balance, however, new equity flotations and retained earnings guarantee that the equity capital locked up in the corporate system will increase.
但是，股票是永久性的。股票的到期日是无限远的。无论美国企业赚取何种回报，股票投资者只能不离不弃。如果美国企业注定获得12%的回报率，这就是股票投资人必须接受的水平。作为一个整体，股票投资者无法退出，也无法重新谈判。总体来说，他们的投入实际上是增加的。个别公司可能被出售、清算或者回购自己的股票，但总体而言，新股发行以及留存收益可以确保锁定在企业系统里的股权资本不断增加。
So, score one for the bond form. Bond coupons eventually will be renegotiated; equity "coupons" won't. It is true, of course, that for a long time a 12 percent coupon did not appear in need of a whole lot of correction.
所以，债券在这点上占优。债券利率最终将被重新商议，股票的“利率”不会。当然，12%的长期利率似乎并不需要很多调整。
The bondholder gets it in cash
债券持有人得到现金
There is another major difference between the garden variety of bond and our new exotic 12 percent "equity bond" that comes to the Wall Street costume ball dressed in a stock certificate.
普通债券和我们新引入的利率为12%的穿着股票外衣来到华尔街化装舞会的“股票债券”还有一个主要区别。
In the usual case, a bond investor receives his entire coupon in cash and is left to reinvest it as best he can. Our stock investor's equity coupon, in contrast, is partially retained by the company and is reinvested at whatever rates the company happens to be earning. In other words, going back to our corporate universe, part of the 12 percent earned annually is paid out in dividends and the balance is put right back into the universe to earn 12 percent also.
通常情况下，债券投资者以现金方式收到全部利息，他可以自己决定这笔钱最好的再投资方式。相比之下，股票投资者的股票利息部分被公司留存，并以公司当时所能赚到的回报率再投资出去。换句话说，公司每年12%的回报部分以现金方式分红，其余则被投资到公司中再赚取12%的回报。 The good old days
美好的昔日时光 This characteristic of stocks - the reinvestment of part of the coupon - can be good or bad news, depending on the relative attractiveness of that 12 percent. The news was very good indeed in, the 1950's and early 1960's. With bonds yielding only 3 or 4 percent, the right to reinvest automatically a portion of the equity coupon at 12 percent was of enormous value. Note that investors could not just invest their own money and get that 12 percent return. Stock prices in this period ranged far above book value, and investors were prevented by the premium prices they had to pay from directly extracting out of the underlying corporate universe whatever rate that universe was earning. You can't pay far above par for a 12 percent bond and earn 12 percent for yourself.
股票的这种特性，即将赚到的利息中的一部分进行再投资，是好消息还是坏消息，这取决于那12%的回报率到底有多诱人。在整个50年代和60年代早期，这的确是个好消息。当债券回报率只有3%～4%的时候，能够有权自动把股票利息的一部分再投资，赚取12%的回报，具有极大的价值。需要提醒的是，投资者不可能在投入自有资金后就自然而然地获取那12%的回报，因为在这个时期里，股票价格已大大地超过了它的净资产值，所以，不论公司的回报率是多少，溢价使得投资者不可能完整地获得这个回报率。这就好比年息12%的债券，当你支付的价格远远高过票面价值后，你是无法获得12%的回报的。 But on their retained earnings, investors could earn 12 percent. In effect, earnings retention allowed investors to buy at book value part of an enterprise that, in the economic environment than existing, was worth a great deal more than book value.
但投资者仍然可以享有盈利留存所带来的12%的回报。事实上，留存意味着投资者可以按净资产值买下这家企业的一部分，而在当时的那种经济环境下，购买企业所要支付的价格会远高于净资产值。 It was a situation that left very little to be said for cash dividends and a lot to be said for earnings retention. Indeed, the more money that investors thought likely to be reinvested at the 12 percent rate, the more valuable they considered their reinvestment privilege, and the more they were willing to pay for it. In the early 1960's, investors eagerly paid top-scale prices for electric utilities situated in growth areas, knowing that these companies had the ability to reinvest very large proportions of their earnings. Utilities whose operating environment dictated a larger cash payout rated lower prices.
这种情况下，人们自然对现金分红敬而远之，而对盈利留存高呼万岁。想以12%的回报率进行再投资的钱越多，这种投资特性就会显得愈加珍贵，投资者愿意为此付出的价格也就越高。在60年代早期，投资者心甘情愿地为坐落于经济成长地区的电力公司股支付高溢价。因为他们知道这些成长型公司有能力将大部分盈利再投资赚取更多回报。而那些受经营环境所迫只能大量派发现金红利的公共事业股则股价相对较低。 If, during this period, a high-grade, noncallable, long-term bond with a 12 percent coupon had existed, it would have sold far above par. And if it were a bond with a further unusual characteristic - which was that most of the coupon payments could be automatically reinvested at par in similar bonds - the issue would have commanded an even greater premium. In essence, growth stocks retaining most of their earnings represented just such a security. When their reinvestment rate on the added equity capital was 12 percent while interest rates generally were around 4 percent, investors became very happy - and, of course, they paid happy prices.
如果在这一时期，有一种高等级、不可赎回、年息为12%的长期债券存在的话，它肯定会以远远高于票面价值的价格出售。此处，如果这种债券还有另外一个不同寻常的特性??该债券的大部分利息可以按面值自动再投资于类似债券，那这些债券必将享受更高的发行溢价。从本质上讲，保留了大部分盈利再投资的成长股正代表了此类证券。当新增的权益资本再投资的回报率是12%而普通利率只有4%左右时，投资者变得非常满意。当然，他们也为此付出了过高的价格。
Heading for the exits
准备退出
Looking back, stock investors can think of themselves in the 1946-66 period as having been ladled a truly bountiful triple dip. First, they were the beneficiaries of an underlying corporate return on equity that was far above prevailing interest rates. Second, a significant portion of that return was reinvested for them at rates that were otherwise unattainable. And third, they were afforded an escalating appraisal of underlying equity capital as the first two benefits became widely recognized. This third dip meant that, on top of the basic 12 percent or so earned by corporations on their equity capital, investors were receiving a bonus as the Dow Jones industrials increased in price from 138 percent book value in 1946 to 220 percent in 1966, Such a marking-up process temporarily allowed investors to achieve a return that exceeded the inherent earning power of the enterprises in which they had invested.
回过头来看，1946～1966年间的股票投资者获得了实实在在的三重好礼。第一，公司的净资产收益率远远高于当时的基准利率。第二，盈利再投资可以获得高回报率，其他途径很难获得这么高的回报率。第三，随着人们普遍认识到前两个优势，除了最基本的大约12%的净资产收益率外，股票投资者还获得额外奖励。道琼斯工业指数的市净率从1946年的1.33倍涨到1966年的2.20倍。在这个市净率上升的过程中，投资者暂时获得了超过其所投资企业内在盈利能力的回报率。 This heaven-on-earth situation finally was "discovered" in the mid-1960's by many major investing institutions. But just as these financial elephants began trampling on one another in their rush to equities, we entered an era of accelerating inflation and higher interest rates. Quite logically, the marking-up process began to reverse itself. Rising interest rates ruthlessly reduced the value of all existing fixed-coupon investments. And as long-term corporate bond rates began moving up (eventually reaching the 10 percent area), both the equity return of 12 percept and the reinvestment "privilege" began to look different.
到60年代中期，众多大型投资机构终于发现了这一“人间天堂”。但是，就在这些金融巨头开始争相买入股票时，我们进入了高通账、高利率的时代。很自然，这个价格上涨的过程开始逆转。利率上涨无情地降低了所有现有固定利率投资标的的价值。随着长期公司债券利率开始上升(最终升至10%左右)，股票12%的回报率和再投资特性也开始遭人白眼了。 Stocks are quite properly thought of as riskier than bonds. While that equity coupon is more or less fixed over periods of time, it does fluctuate somewhat from year to year. Investors' attitudes about the future can be affected substantially, although frequently erroneously, by those yearly changes. Stocks are also riskier because they come equipped with infinite maturities. (Even your friendly broker wouldn't have the nerve to peddle a 100-year bond, if he had any available, as "safe.") Because of the additional risk, the natural reaction of investors is to expect an equity return that is comfortably above the bond return - and 12 percent on equity versus, say, 10 percent on bonds issued py the same corporate universe does not seem to qualify as comfortable. As the spread narrows, equity investors start looking for the exits.
人们认为股票的风险比债券大，这一点无可厚非。虽然股票回报率长期来看大致固定，但每年的确有波动。投资者对未来的态度受每年波动的影响相当大，虽然这种影响经常是错误的。股票的风险大的另外一个因素是，它们的到期日遥遥无期。由于这层额外风险，投资者自然的反应是期望股票回报率稳稳高于债券回报率，比如说，如果债券的回报率为10%，那么同一类型公司发行的回报率为12%的股票就不能算作“稳稳”。随着差价缩减，股票投资者开始另寻退路。 But, of course, as a group they can't get out. All they can achieve is a lot of movement, substantial frictional costs, and a new, much lower level of valuation, reflecting the lessened attractiveness of the 12 percent equity coupon under inflationary conditions. Bond investors have had a succession of shocks over the past decade in the course of discovering that there is no magic attached to any given coupon level - at 6 percent, or 8 percept, or 10 percent, bonds can still collapse in price. Stock investors, who are in general not aware that they too have a "coupon", are still receiving their education on this point.
但是，股票投资者作为一个整体不能退出。他们所能得到的东西只能是更多的换手，大量的摩擦成本，不断创新低的估值。这反映了在通胀条件下，回报率为12%的股票的吸引力在减少。过去的10年里，在经历了接二连三的打击后，债券投资者认识到任何高利率都不保险??无论是6%、或8%、还是10%??都无法阻止债券价格的崩溃。由于股票投资者还没有完全意识到自己持有的也是一种“债券”，所以他们还得接受教肓。 Five ways to improve earnings
提高盈利的五种方法 Must we really view that 12 percent equity coupon as immutable? Is there any law that says the corporate return on equity capital cannot adjust itself upward in response to a permanently higher average rate of inflation?
这种12%的股票利率注定是一成不变的吗?是否存在着某条法律禁止公司提高其净资产收益率以应对似乎永远在不断攀升的通货膨胀率呢？ There is no such law, of course. On the other hand, corporate America cannot increase earnings by desire or decree. To raise that return on equity, corporations would need at least one of the following: (1) an increase in turnover, i.e., in the ratio between sales and total assets employed in the business; (2) cheaper leverage; (3) more leverage; (4) lower income taxes, (5) wider operating margins on sales.
当然，并没有这样一条法律。恰恰相反，美国公司不能随心所欲或通过制定法律来提高公司盈利。要提高净资产收益率，公司至少需要做到以下一点：
(1)提高总资产周转率，即销售收入与总资产的比率；
(2)便宜的杠杆；
(3)更高的杠杆；
(4)降低所得税；
(5)更高的营业利润率。
（译者注：营业利润率=营业利润/销售收入，营业利润也称为息税前利润（EBIT，earnings before interest rate and tax。） 
And that's it. There simply are no other ways to increase returns on common equity. Let's see what can be done with these.
就这么多，应该没有其他的方法能够提高净资产收益率了。下面我们将仔细阐述。 We'll begin with turnover. The three major categories of assets we have to think about for this exercise are accounts receivable inventories, and fixed assets such as plants and machinery.
我们先从总资产周转率开始。为了分析总资产周转率，我们必须考虑三个主要类型的资产：应收账款、存货和固定资产（如厂房和机器设备）。 Accounts receivable go up proportionally as sales go up, whether the increase in dollar sales is produced by more physical volume or by inflation. No room for improvement here.
不管以美元计的销售收入增加是由销量增加引起的还是由通胀引起的，当它增加的时候，应收账款也会成比例增加。在这里应收账款周转率没有改善的空间。 With inventories, the situation is not quite as simple. Over the long term, the trend in unit inventories may be expected to follow the trend in unit sales. Over the short term, however, the physical turnover rate may bob around because of special influences - e.g., cost expectations, or bottlenecks.
至于存货，情况就没这么简单了。长期来看，存货数量的走势会跟随销售数量的走势。但是，短期内，存货数量会由于供应关系的瓦解、采购成本的变化等因素而变化无常。
The use of last-in, first-out (LIFO) inventory-valuation methods serves to increase the reported turnover rate during inflationary times. When dollar sales are rising because of inflation, inventory valuations of a LIFO company either will remain level, (if unit sales are not rising) or will trail the rise in dollar sales (if unit sales are rising). In either case, dollar turnover will increase.
在通胀期内，采用“后进先出法”核算存货有助于提高报表上的存货周转率。当通胀引起销售收入增加时，采用“后进先出法”的公司（如果销售数量没有增加）将能维持现有的存货水平，或者（如果销售数量增加）随着销售收入的增加而增加。无论哪一种情况，存货周转率都能得到增加。
（译者注：存货周转率=销售数量*售价/存货数量*成本价，由于售价高于成本价，销售数量小于存货数量，当存货数量的增加与销售数量的增加差不多时，存货周转率显然是增加的。） During the early 1970's, there was a pronounced swing by corporations toward LIFO accounting (which has the effect of lowering a company's reported earnings and tax bills). The trend now seems to have slowed. Still, the existence of a lot of LIFO companies, plus the likelihood that some others will join the crowd, ensures some further increase it the reported turnover of inventory.
在70年代早期，公司有一个显著的变化，“后进先出法”成为潮流（这样做会降低公司报表上的盈利和税收）。目前这种趋势有减缓的迹象，但那些已经采用这个原则和那些即将采用这个原则的公司，足以进一步增加报表上的存货周转率。 The gains are apt to be modest
提高是有限的
In the case of fixed assets, any rise in the inflation rate, assuming it affects all products equally, will initially have the effect of increasing turnover. That is true because sales will immediately reflect the new price level, while the fixed-asset account will reflect the change only gradually, i.e., as existing assets are retired and replaced at the new prices. Obviously, the more slowly a company goes about this replacement process, the more the turnover ratio will rise. The action stops, however, when a replacement cycle is completed. Assuming a constant rate of inflation, sales and fixed assets will then begin to rise in concert at the rate of inflation.
再来看固定资产。假设通胀对所有产品的影响是一样，在这种情况下，通胀率的任何增长，其首先的结果便是提高固定资产周转率。这是因为销售收入会立即反映新的价格水平，而固定资产只能逐步地反映变化，比如，只有在现有设备被淘汰后，才能以新价格设备取代它。很明显，公司的设备更新过程越缓慢，固定资产周转率上涨越快。只有当更新周期完成后，这个趋势才会停止。假设通胀率不变，销售收入和固定资产会以通胀的节奏增长。
To sum up, inflation will produce some gains in turnover ratios. Some improvement would be certain because of LIFO, and some would be possible (if inflation accelerates) because of sales rising more rapidly than fixed assets. But the gains are apt to be modest and not of a magnitude to produce substantial improvement in returns on equity capital. During the decade ending in 1975, despite generally accelerating inflation and the extensive use of LIFO accounting, the turnover ratio of the FORTUNE 500 went only from 1.18/1 to 1.29/1.
总的来说，通胀能带来总资产周转率一定程度的上升。其中一部分上升是肯定的，因为使用“后进先出法”的存货计价方法；如果通胀加速，另一部分上升是可能的，因为销售收入上升快于固定资产上升。但是，通胀所带来的总资产周转率上升是有限的，其程度不足以导致净资产收益率的大幅上升。在1966～1975年这10年间，尽管总体上通胀在加速，企业广泛采用“后进先出法”，但财富500强公司的总资产周转率仅仅从1.18/1上升到1.29/1。 Cheaper leverage? Not likely. High rates of inflation generally cause borrowing to become dearer, not cheaper. Galloping rates of inflation create galloping capital needs; and lenders, as they become increasingly distrustful of long-term contracts, become more demanding. But even if there is no further rise in interest rates, leverage will be getting more expensive because the average cost of the debt now on corporate books is less than would be the cost of replacing it. And replacement will be required as the existing debt matures. Overall, then, future changes in the cost of leverage seem likely to have a mildly depressing effect on the return on equity.
使用便宜的杠杆呢?这不太可能。高通胀率通常会导致借贷成本变得昂贵，而不是便宜。飞速上涨的通胀率会催生出更多的资本需求，由于贷款人对长期合同的不信任感日渐加深，他们开始索要得更多。即使利率不再进一步上升，杠杆也会变得更贵，因为公司账面上的平均债务成本低于替代成本。现有债务到期后，将被新的更贵的债务替代。整体而言，杠杆成本未来的变化会对净资产收益率产生轻微的抑制作用。 More leverage? American business already has fired many, if not most, of the more-leverage bullets once available to it. Proof of that proposition can be seen in some other FORTUNE 500 statistics - in the twenty years ending in 1975, stockholders' equity as a percentage of total assets declined for the 500 from 63 percent to just under 50 percent. In other words, each dollar of equity capital now is leveraged much more heavily than it used to be.
使用更高的杠杆呢？美国公司早已消耗了太多（如果不是全部）能使用的“杠杆型”子弹。要证明这一论点，可在财富500强的另外一组统计数据中找到：在1956～1975年的20年里，财富500强的净资产占总资产的百分比从63%降到了50%以下。换句话说，每一美元的净资产已经比过去利用了更高的杠杆。 What the lenders learned
放贷者的教训
An irony of inflation-induced financial requirements is that the highly profitable companies - generally the best credits - require relatively little debt capital. But the laggards in profitability never can get enough. Lenders understand this problem much better than they did a decade ago - and are correspondingly less willing to let capital-hungry, low-profitability enterprises leverage themselves to the sky.
通胀引发了一个具有讽刺意味的融资需求，高盈利公司通常是那些信用等级最好的公司，它们对债务的需求也相对较少，而盈利较差的公司似乎永远欲壑难填。放贷者对这个问题的理解要比10年前深刻多了，他们不愿意贷款给资金匮乏，盈利不佳的公司，让他们把杠杆抬高到天上去。
Nevertheless, given inflationary conditions, many corporations seem sure in the future to turn to still more leverage as a means of shoring up equity returns. Their managements will make that move because they will need enormous amounts of capital - often merely to do the same physical volume of business - and will wish to got it without cutting dividends or making equity offerings that, because of inflation, are not apt to shape up as attractive. Their natural response will be to heap on debt, almost regardless of cost. They will tend to behave like those utility companies that argued over an eighth of a point in the 1960's and were grateful to find 12 percent debt financing in 1974.
然而，在通胀环境下，许多公司未来似乎确定会通过提高杠杆来提振净资产收益率。公司管理层出此决策是因为他们需要比往日更多的资金才能维持公司的业务规模。在不能减少分红以及无法增发新股（因为通胀的关系，股权的吸引力大大减小）的情况下，要想得到额外的资金，一个自然而然的选择便是增加债务，而几乎无暇顾及债务的成本。他们往往会像那些公共事业公司一样，在60年代中，为8个点的利息争论不休，而到了1974年，为了能得到12%的债务融资而感激涕零。
（译者注：8个点的利息指的是年息8%） Added debt at present interest rates, however, will do less for equity returns than did added debt at 4 percent rates it the early 1960's. There is also the problem that higher debt ratios cause credit ratings to be lowered, creating a further rise in interest costs.
不过，以当前利率增加的债务对净资产收益率的贡献要小于那些在60年代早期以4%利率增加的债务。更糟糕的是，负债率上升还会导致信用评级被下调，导致利息成本进一步上升。
So that is another way, to be added to those already discussed, in which the cost of leverage will be rising. In total, the higher costs of leverage are likely to offset the benefits of greater leverage.
这一点再加上前面讨论的几点，未来的杠杆成本必将上升。总的来看，杠杆成本的升高很可能抵消因杠杆规模扩大而带来的好处。
Besides, there is already far more debt in corporate America than is conveyed by conventional balance sheets. Many companies have massive pension obligations geared to whatever pay levels will be in effect when present workers retire. At the low inflation rates of 1955-65, the liabilities arising from such plans were reasonably predictable. Today, nobody can really know the company's ultimate obligation, But if the inflation rate averages 7 percent in the future, a twentyfive-year-old employee who is now earning $12,000, and whose raises do no more than match increases in living costs, will be making $180,000 when he retires at sixty-five.
另外，与传统的资产负债表相比，美国公司早已债台高筑。许多公司还承担着庞大的养老金债务，当公司现任员工退休时，任何工资水平的支付都会带来实际的影响。在低通胀的1955～1965年，这种养老金计划所带来的债务多少还能够预测，而今天，已经没有人能够真正搞清楚公司的最终债务是多少。如果未来通胀率平均为7%，一名25岁的年薪为1.2万元的员工，仅仅为了满足生活成本的增长，当他65岁退休时，他每年需要领取18万元。
（译者注：通用公司这是这样死的。） Of course, there is a marvelously precise figure in many annual reports each year, purporting to be the unfunded pension liability. If that figure were really believable, a corporation could simply ante up that sum, add to it the existing pension-fund assets, turn the total amount over to an insurance company, and have it assume all the corporation's present pension liabilities. In the real world, alas, it is impossible to find an insurance company willing even to listen to such a deal.
当然，公司每年的报表上都有一项关于未履行的养老金债务的精确数字。如果这个数字是真实可信的，那么公司可以预先支付这一数字的金额，将其加入到现有的养老金资产，然后将这笔钱移交给某一家保险公司，让这家保险公司对这笔养老金提供担保。不幸的是，在真实世界里，恐怕根本找不到一家愿意听一听这笔交易的保险公司。
Virtually every corporate treasurer in America would recoil at the idea of issuing a "cost-of-living" bond - a noncallable obligation with coupons tied to a price index. But through the private pension system, corporate America has in fact taken on a fantastic amount of debt that is the equivalent of such a bond.
事实上，对于这种不可赎回的、利率与物价挂钩的“生活成本”债券，任何一家美国公司的财务主管都会在它的发行问题上打退堂鼓。但是通过私人的养老金系统，美国公司实际上承担了大量相当于“生活成本”债券的债务。
More leverage, whether through conventional debt or unbooked and indexed "pension debt", should be viewed with skepticism by shareholders. A 12 percent return from an enterprise that is debt-free is far superior to the same return achieved by a business hocked to its eyeballs. Which means that today's 12 percent equity returns may well be less valuable than the 12 percent returns of twenty years ago.
对于杠杆的增加，不管是传统债务，还是账外的与物价挂钩的“养老金债务”，股东都应该持怀疑态度。企业在不负债的情况下获得12%的回报率要远远好于债台高筑的企业获得同样的回报率。这意味着，如今公司12%的回报率的价值要远低于20年前12%的回报率的价值。 More fun in New York
纽约更有趣 Lower corporate income taxes seem unlikely. Investors in American corporations already own what might be thought of as a Class D stock. The class A, B and C stocks are represented by the income-tax claims of the federal, state, and municipal governments. It is true that these "investors" have no claim on the corporation's assets; however, they get a major share of the earnings, including earnings generated by the equity buildup resulting from retention of part of the earnings owned by the Class D sharaholders.
降低公司的所得税似乎不太可能。投资者所持有的美国公司股票只能算作D类。A、B和C三类股票分别由联邦、州和市政府所持有，代表的是他们征收所得税的权利。虽然这些“投资人”对公司的资产并不拥有所有权，但他们有权在公司盈利中分享一大块，即使这些盈利是D类股东的盈利留存所创造出来的也不例外。 A further charming characteristic of these wonderful Class A, B and C stocks is that their share of the corporation's earnings can be increased immedtately, abundantly, and without payment by the unilateral vote of any one of the "stockholder" classes, e.g., by congressional action in the case of the Class A. To add to the fun, one of the classes will sometimes vote to increase its ownership share in the business retroactively - as companies operating in New York discovered to their dismay in 1975. Whenever the Class A, B or C "stockholders" vote themselves a larger share of the business, the portion remaining for Class D - that's the one held by the ordinary investor - declines.
A、B、C三类股票的另一个诱人之处是，只要任何一类“股东”进行单边投票，无需付款，就能突然地、大幅地提高对企业的盈利分成，比如，对A 类“股东”而言，只要国会采取行动即可。更有趣的是，任何一类“股东”都可以追溯提高自己在公司享有权上的份额，比如1975年在纽约的公司就遭遇了此类“好事”。每当A、B、C 三类“股东”投票提高他们在公司中所占的份额时，剩下的部分，也就是留给D类普通股票投资者的部分，肯定就会减少。 Looking ahead, it seems unwise to assume that those who control the A, B and C shares will vote to reduce their own take over the long run. The class D shares probably will have to struggle to hold their own.
展望未来，假设那些控制着A、B、C三类股票的人投票减少自己的份额似乎是不明智的，D类股东能保住自己那一份就不错了。
Bad news from the FTC
来自联邦贸易委员会的坏消息
The last of our five possible sources of increased returns on equity is wider operating margins on sales. Here is where some optimists would hope to achieve major gains. There is no proof that they are wrong. Bu there are only 100 cents in the sales dollar and a lot of demands on that dollar before we get down to the residual, pretax profits. The major claimants are labor, raw materials energy, and various non-income taxes. The relative importance of these costs hardly, seems likely to decline during an age of inflation.
在提高净资产收益率的5种方法中，最后一个是提高营业利润率。一些乐观主义者对此寄以厚望。没有证据表明他们的乐观是错误的。但是，1美元的销售收入里面只有100美分。在我们得到剩余的部分也就是息税前利润之前还要扣除多项支出。主要项目包括人力成本、原材料、能源和各种各样的非所得税。这些成本的比重在通胀时期不太可能降低。 Recent statistical evidence, furthermore, does not inspire confidence in the proposition that margins will widen in, a period of inflation. In the decade ending in 1965, a period of relatively low inflation, the universe of manufacturing companies reported on quarterly by the Federal Trade Commission had an average annual pretax margin on sales of 8.6 percent. In the decade ending in 1975, the average margin was 8 percent. Margins were down, in other words, despite a very considerable increase in the inflation rate.
此外，在通胀时期营业利润率将被提高的观点，并没有得到最近的统计数据的支持。1956～1965年，这10年是一个通胀率相对较低的时期，联邦贸易委员会的季度报告显示，这一时期制造业公司的平均营业利润率为8.6%。1966～1975年，这10年间的平均营业利润率为8%。换句话说，尽管通胀率有了相当大的增加，但营业利润率却下降了。 If business was able to base its prices on replacement costs, margins would widen in inflationary periods. But the simple fact is that most large businesses, despite a widespread belief in their market power, just don't manage to pull it off. Replacement cost accounting almost always shows that corporate earnings have declined significantly in the past decade. If such major industries as oil, steel, and aluminum really have the oligopolistic muscle imputed to them, one can only conclude that their pricing policies have been remarkably restrained.
如果企业能够根据重置成本定价，那么在通胀时期利润将会提高。但一个简单的事实是，大多数大型企业，尽管他们的市场影响力得到人们普遍认同，但他们依然无法转嫁成本。重置成本会计方法几乎总是显示公司利润在过去10年中显著下降。如果这些大型企业如石油、钢铁、铝业等确实有寡头垄断的实力却无法提价，我们只能得出结论，他们的定价权受到了明显的限制。 There you have, the complete lineup: five factors that can improve returns on common equity, none of which, by my analysis, are likely to take us very far in that direction in periods of high inflation. You may have emerged from this exercise more optimistic than I am. But remember, returns in the 12 percent area have been with us a long time.
现在你已经全部了解了五种可以提高净资产收益率的方法，但根据我以上的分析，没有哪一种方法能在高通胀的环境下达到显著提高回报率的目的。你也许能得出比我更乐观的结论。但请牢记，12%左右的回报率已伴随我们很长时间了。 The investor's equation
投资者的公式
Even if you agree that the 12 percent equity coupon is more or less immutable, you still may hope to do well with it in the years ahead. It's conceivable that you will. After all, a lot of investors did well with it for a long time. But your future results will be governed by three variable's: the relationship between book value and market value, the tax rate, and the inflation rate.
即使你同意12%的股票利率或多或少是不可改变的，你仍然希望在未来能取得良好的业绩。这是可以理解的。毕竟有很多投资者长期业绩很好。但是，你未来的业绩受到三个变量的制约：净值与市值的关系、税率和通胀率。
（译者注：book value就是账面价值，也就是净资产值，简称净值）
Let's wade through a little arithmetic about book and market value. When stocks consistently sell at book value, it's all very simple. If a stock has a book value of $100 and also an average market value of $100, 12 percent earnings by business will produce a 12 percent return for the investor (less those frictional costs, which we'll ignore for the moment). If the payout ratio is 50 percent, our investor will get $6 via dividends and a further $6 from the increase in the book value of the business, which will, of course, be reflected in the market value of his holdings.
让我们化些力气在净值和市值上做些计算。如果股票总是按净值出售，事情就变得非常简单。如果一只股票的净值是100美元，其平均市值也是100美元，企业12%的盈利就会转化为投资者12%的回报（当然要减去摩擦成本，我们暂时不去考虑它）。如果派息率是50%，我们的投资者将得到6美元的现金分红和6美元的净值增加。当然，增加的6美元净值自然会在持有的市值中得得到体现。
If the stock sold at 150 percent of book value, the picture would change. The investor would receive the same $6 cash dividend, but it would now represent only a 4 percent return on his $150 cost. The book value of the business would still increase by 6 percent (to $106) and the market value of the investor's holdings, valued consistently at 150 percent of book value, would similarly increase by 6 percent (to $159). But the investor's total return, i.e., from appreciation plus dividends, would be only 10 percent versus the underlying 12 percent earned by the business.
如果股票是按净值的150%出售，情况就不一样了。虽然投资者将收到相同的6美元现金分红，但是相对于150美元的购买成本，回报率只有4%。公司的净值也会增加6%（达到106美元）。如果150%净值的定价不变，投资者所持有的市值也同样会增加6%（达到159美元）。但是投资者的总回报率（包括市价增值及现金分红）只有10%，比公司内在的12%的回报率要低。 When the investor buys in below book value, the process is reversed. For example, if the stock sells at 80 percent of book value, the same earnings and payout assumptions would yield 7.5 percent from dividends ($6 on an $80 price) and 6 percent from appreciation - a total return of 13.5 percent. In other words, you do better by buying at a discount rather than a premium, just as common sense would suggest.
如果投资者的买价低于净值，情况正好相反。举例而言，如果股票价格只有净值的80%，在相同的盈利和分配条件下，股息率将达到7.5%(6美元现金分红除以80美元股价)，市价增值6%，总回报率为13.5%。换句话说，要想干得更出色，得折价而不是溢价买进，这是常识。 During the postwar years, the market value of the Dow Jones industrials has been as low as 84 percent of book value (in 1974) and as high as 232 percent (in 1965); most of the time the ratio has been well over 100 percent. (Early this spring, it was around 110 percent.) Let's assume that in the future the ratio will be something close to 100 percent - meaning that investors in stocks could earn the full 12 percent. At least, they could earn that figure before taxes and before inflation.
在二战后的岁月里，道琼斯工业指数的市净率是0.84（1974年），最高是2.32（1965年）。大数时间里，市净率都超过1（今年早春，市净率大约是1.1）。让我们假设未来市净率大致接近于1，这意味着股票投资者可以足额得到那12%的盈利。至少，在扣除税收和通胀之前，他们能够获得那个数字。 7 percent after taxes
税后的7% How large a bite might taxes take out of the 12 percent? For individual investors, it seems reasonable to assume that federal, state, and local income taxes will average perhaps 50 percent on dividends and 30 percent on capital gains. A majority of investors may have marginal rates somewhat below these, but many with larger holdings will experience substantially higher rates. Under the new tax law, as FORTUNE observed last month, a high-income investor in a heavily taxed city could have a marginal rate on capital gains as high as 56 percent.
在这12%的回报中，税收会抽走多少呢？对于个人投资者而言，如果将联邦、州和地方的税收相加，可以确信，将征走股息的50%以及资本利得的30%。多数投资者的适用税率可能会低于此税率，但那些大投资者将会承受高得多的税率。随着新税法的颁布，根据《财富》杂志的报道，在高税收的城市中，高收入者的资本利得的适用税率高达56%。 So let's use 50 percent and 30 percent as representative for individual investors. Let's also assume, in line with recent experience, that corporations earning 12 percent on equity pay out 5 percent in cash dividends (2.5 percent after tax) and retain 7 percent, with those retained earnings producing a corresponding market-value growth (4.9 percent after the 30 percent tax). The after-tax return, then, would be 7.4 percent. Probably this should be rounded down to about 7 percent to allow for frictional costs. To push our stocks-asdisguised-bonds thesis one notch further, then, stocks might be regarded as the equivalent, for individuals, of 7 percent tax-exempt perpetual bonds.
因此，让我们用50%的股息税和30%的资本利得税作为投资者的代表吧。让我们以近期的经验来假设，公司12%的净资产收益率中，5%以现金分红的形式派发（税后降为2.5%），7%保留使市值得到相应增长(30%资本利得税后降为4.9%)。这样，全部除税后回报率为7.4%。如果考虑到摩擦成本则回报率会下降到7%。如果要将我们的股票即债券的理论阐述得更准确一些，我们得说，对个人而言，股票可以被认为是利率7%的免税永久债券。
（译者注：我们国家的股息税率为10%，资本利得税为0%。如果假设我们国家股市的净资产收益率也是12%，市净率为1的话，除税后，实际回报率是11.5%。） The number nobody knows
一个没人知道的数字 Which brings us to the crucial question - the inflation rate. No one knows the answer on this one - including the politicians, economists, and Establishment pundits, who felt, a few years back, that with slight nudges here and there unemployment and inflation rates would respond like trained seals.
让我们回到关键性的问题??通胀率。没有人知道这个问题的答案，包括那些政治家、经济学家以及权威学者。就在几年前，这些人还觉得，只要这里那里轻微调节一下，失业率和通胀率就会像受过训练的海豹一样温和。 But many signs seem negative for stable prices: the fact that inflation is now worldwide; the propensity of major groups in our society to utilize their electoral muscle to shift, rather than solve, economic problems ; the demonstrated unwillingness to tackle even the most vital problems (e.g., energy and nuclear proliferation) if they can be postponed; and a political system that rewards legislators with reelection if their actions appear to produce short-term benefits even though their ultimate imprint will be to compound long-term pain.
但是，许多迹象显示价格难以保持稳定：目前的通胀是全球性的；政客们倾向于转嫁经济问题，而不是解决经济问题；如果可以推迟，即使是最重要的问题（如能源、核扩散），政客们也不愿解决；我们的政治制度在于，要想赢得选举胜利，就必须追求短期利益，尽管这最终会招致长期的痛苦。 Most of those in political office, quite understandably, are firmly against inflation and firmly in favor of policies producing it. (This schizophrenia hasn't caused them to lose touch with reality, however; Congressmen have made sure that their pensions - unlike practically all granted in the private sector - are indexed to cost-of-living changes after retirement.)
多数政客都强烈反对通胀，但他们都坚定支持制造通胀的政策。（这种精神分裂并没有导致他们现实意识的丧失，政客们早已确保他们的养老金会与退休后的生活成本挂钩，其发放形式完全不同于私有部门。） Discussions regarding future inflation rates usually probe the subtleties of monetary and fiscal policies. These are important variables in determining the outcome of any specific inflationary equation. But, at the source, peacetime inflation is a political problem, not an economic problem. Human behavior, not monetary behavior, is the key. And when very human politicians choose between the next election and the next generation, it's clear what usually happens.
人们对于未来通胀率的讨论通常局限于探讨货币政策和财政政策的细微之处。这两者是决定通账率高低的重要变量。这些是决定通胀公式具体结果的重要变量。但是，从本源上讲，和平时期的通胀是个政治问题而不是个经济问题，问题的关键是人的行为而非货币行为。政客也是人，是选择下一次连任，还是选择下一代福利，结果是不言自明的。 Such broad generalizations do not produce precise numbers. However, it seems quite possible to me that inflation rates will average 7 percent in future years. I hope this forecast proves to be wrong. And it may well be. Forecasts usually tell us more of the forecaster than of the future. You are free to factor your own inflation rate into the investor's equation. But if you foresee a rate averaging 2 percent or 3 percent, you are wearing different glasses than I am.
这种泛泛而论并不能得出精确的数字。但是，我认为，未来几年里通胀率非常有可能将维持在7%左右。我希望这个预测是错的，但它可能是对的。对未来的预测通常告诉我们更多是有关预测者的信息，而不是有关未来的信息。你完全可以将自己认定的通胀率替换到投资公式中去。但是，如果你预测的通胀率是2%～3%，那你的视角肯定和我不同。 So there we are: 12 percent before taxes and inflation; 7 percent after taxes and before inflation; and maybe zero percent after taxes and inflation. It hardly sounds like a formula that will keep all those cattle stampeding on TV.
所以，我们得到的结论是：在扣除通胀及税之前股票有12%的回报；扣税但不扣除通胀，股票还有7%的回报；扣除税和通胀后股票的回报为零。这可不像是一个令人激动人心的公式。 As a common stockholder you will have more dollars, but you may have no more purchasing power. Out with Ben Franklin ("a penny saved is a penny earned") and in with Milton Friedman ("a man might as well consume his capital as invest it").
作为一名普通投资者，你能得到更多的钱，但是你不能得到更多的购买力。这与本杰明?富兰克林所说的不同（“省钱就是赚钱”），但与米尔顿?弗里德曼所说的一致（“一个人投资还不如消费”）。 What widows don't notice
寡妇们没有注意到的事情 The arithmetic makes it plain that inflation is a far more devastating tax than anything that has been enacted by our legislatures. The inflation tax has a fantastic ability to simply consume capital. It makes no difference to a widow with her savings in a 5 percent passbook account whether she pays 100 percent income tax on her interest income during a period of zero inflation, or pays no income taxes during years of 5 percent inflation. Either way, she is "taxed" in a manner that leaves her no real income whatsoever. Any money she spends comes right out of capital. She would find outrageous a 120 percent income tax, but doesn't seem to notice that 6 percent inflation is the economic equivalent.
该计算清楚地表明，通胀是一种税，而且这种税要比我们立法机构制定的任何税更具破坏性。“通胀税”具有奇异的吞噬资金的能力。对于一个拥有利率为5%的银行存折的寡妇来说，零通胀时100%的所得税和零所得税时5%的通胀率是一样的。不管怎样，两种“征税”的方式，使她没有任何实际收入。她所花出去的每一分钱都来自于本金。她无疑会对120%的所得税感到气愤，却似乎不会注意到6%的通胀率在经济上等价于120%的所得税。 If my inflation assumption is close to correct, disappointing results will occur not because the market falls, but in spite of the fact that the market rises. At around 920 early last month, the Dow was up fifty-five points from where it was ten years ago. But adjusted for inflation, the Dow is down almost 345 points - from 865 to 520. And about half of the earnings of the Dow had to be withheld from their owners and reinvested in order to achieve even that result.
如果我对通胀的假设接近正确，不仅市场下跌时的结果会令人失望，市场上升时的结果也会令人失望。上月初，道琼斯指数是920点，比10年前上涨55点。但是，经过通胀调整后，道琼斯指数实际下跌了大约345点（从865点跌到520点）。即使为了取得这样的结果，道琼斯指数大约一半的盈利还不得不留存和再投资。 In the next ten years, the Dow would be doubled just by a combination of the 12 percent equity coupon, a 40 percent payout ratio, and the present 110 percent ratio of market to book value. And with 7 percent inflation, investors who sold at 1800 would still be considerably worse off than they are today after paying their capital-gains taxes.
下一个10年，只要股票保持12%的净资产收益率，40%的派息率和1.1倍的市净率不变，道琼斯指数将翻倍。如果通胀率是7%，即使投资者是在道指1800点时卖出股票，在支付了资本利得税之后，其实际购买力还不如今天的水平。
I can almost hear the reaction of some investors to these downbeat thoughts. It will be to assume that, whatever the difficulties presented by the new investment era, they will somehow contrive to turn in superior results for themselves. Their success is most unlikely. And, in aggregate, of course, impossible. If you feel you can dance in and out of securities in a way that defeats the inflation tax, I Would like to be your broker - but not your partner.
说到这里，我几乎可以听得见投资者对我的悲观预测的反应了。可以猜到，无论新的投资时代会带来何种困难，他们都会想方设法为自己谋划一个超级回报。他们是不可能成功的。而作为一个整体来看，这更加不可能。如果你感觉你可以通过买卖股票来击败通胀税，我很乐意做你的经纪人而不是合伙人。 Even the so-called tax-exempt investors, such as pension funds and college endowment funds, do not escape the inflation tax. If my assumption of a 7 percent inflation rate is correct, a college treasurer should regard the first 7 percent earned each year merely as a replenishment of purchasing power. Endowment funds are earning nothing until they have outpaced the inflation treadmill. At 7 percent inflation and, say, overall investment returns of 8 percent, these institutions, which believe they are tax-exempt, are in fact paying "income taxes" of 87½ percent.
即使是那些所谓的免税投资者，如养老基金和大学捐赠基金，也无法回避通胀税。如果我假设的7%的通胀率是正确的，那么每年7%的回报率仅仅只能弥补购买力的损失。在7%的通胀水平下，如果回报率为8%，这些自认为是免税的机构实际上是被征收了87.5%的“所得税”。 The social equation
Unfortunately, the major problems from high inflation rates flow not to investors but to society as a whole. Investment income is a small portion of national income, and if per capita real income could grow at a healthy rate alongside zero real investment returns, social justice might well be advanced. A market economy creates some lopsided payoffs to participants. The right endowment of vocal chords, anatomical structure, physical strength, or mental powers can produce enormous piles of claim checks (stocks, bonds, and other forms of capital) on future national output. People selection of ancestors similarly can result in lifetime supplies of such tickets upon birth. If zero real investment returns diverted a bit greater portion of the national output from such stockholders to equally worthy and hardworking citizens lacking jackpot-producing talents, it would seem unlikely to pose such an insult to an equitable world as to risk Divine Intervention. But the potential for real improvement in the welfare of workers at the expense of affluent stockholders is not significant. Employee compensation already totals twenty-eight times the amount paid out in dividends, and a lot of those dividends now go to pension funds, nonprofit institutions such as universities, and individual stockholders who are not affluent. Under these circumstances, if we now shifted all dividends of wealthy stockholders into wages - something we could do only once, like killing a cow (or, if you prefer, a pig) - we would increase real wages by less than we used to obtain from one year's growth of the economy. The Russians understand it too
Therefore, diminishment of the affluent, through the impact of inflation on their investments, will not even provide material short-term aid to those who are not affluent. Their economic well-being will rise or fall with the general effects of inflation on the economy. And those effects are not likely to be good. Large gains in real capital, invested in modern production facilities, are required to produce large gains in economic well-being. Great labor availability, great consumer wants, and great government promises will lead to nothing but great frustration without continuous creation and employment of expensive new capital assets throughout industry. That's an equation understood by Russians as well as Rockefellers. And it's one that has been applied with stunning success in West Germany and Japan. High capital-accumulation rates have enabled those countries to achieve gains in living standards at rates far exceeding ours, even though we have enjoyed much the superior position in energy.
To understand the impact of inflation upon real capital accumulation, a little math is required. Come back for a moment to that 12 percent return on equity capital. Such earnings are stated after depreciation, which presumably will allow replacement of present productive capacity - if that plant and equipment can be purchased in the future at prices similar to their original cost.
The way it was
Let's assume that about half of earnings are paid out in dividends, leaving 6 percent of equity capital available to finance future growth. If inflation is low - say, 2 percent - a large portion of that growth can be real growth in physical output. For under these conditions, 2 percent more will have to be invested in receivables, inventories, and fixed assets next year just to duplicate this year's physical output - leaving 4 percent for investment in assets to produce more physical goods. The 2 percent finances illusory dollar growth reflecting inflation and the remaining 4 percent finances real growth. If population growth is 1 percent, the 4 percent gain in real output translates into a 3 percent gain in real per capita net income. That, very roughly, is what used to happen in our economy.
Now move the inflation rate to 7 percent and compute what is left for real growth after the financing of the mandatory inflation component. The answer is nothing - if dividend policies and leverage ratios Terrain unchanged. After half of the 12 percent earnings are paid out, the same 6 percent is left, but it is all conscripted to provide the added dollars needed to transact last year's physical volume of business. Many companies, faced with no real retained earnings with which to finance physical expansion after normal dividend payments, will improvise. How, they will ask themselves, can we stole or reduce dividends without risking stockholder wrath? I have good news for them: ready-made set of blueprints is available.
许多公司在正常派息后，所剩的盈余实际上已无法为业务的扩张提供资金。有鉴于此，许多公司谋求改变，他们扪心自问，怎样才能在不触怒股东的情况下减少甚至停止支付股息？我给他们带来了一些好消息：现在已经有这样的方案了。 In recent years the electric-utility industry has had little or no dividend-paying capacity. Or, rather, it has had the power to pay dividends if investors agree to buy stock from them. In 1975 electric utilities paid common dividends of $3.3 billion and asked investors to return $3.4 billion. Of course, they mixed in a little solicit-Peter-to-pay-Paul technique so as not to acquire a Con Ed reputation. Con Ed, you will remember, was unwise enough in 1974 to simply tell its shareholders it didn't have the money to pay the dividend, Candor was rewarded with calamity in the marketplace.
近几年公共电力行业早已丧失了支付红利的能力，除非股东们同意购买其增发的股票，否则他们无法继续分红。1975年，电力行业支付普通股股息33亿美元，却要求投资者返还34亿美元。当然，电力企业实施这种把钱从左口袋移到右口袋的技巧并不是为了面子。也许你还记得，1974年，Con Ed电力公司非常干脆地告诉它们的股东，公司再也没有钱可用于分红了，市场对这种坦诚但不明智的做法给予了灾难性的回答。 The more sophisticated utility maintains - perhaps increases - the quarterly dividend and then asks shareholders (either old or new) to mail back the money. In other words, the company issues new stock. This procedure diverts massive amounts of capital to the tax collector and substantial sums to underwriters. Everyone, however, seems to remain in spirits (particularly the underwriters).
现在，精明一点的公共事业类公司继续分红，甚至还增加季度分红，但要求（新、老）股东返还这些钱。换句话说，公司会增发新股。这一过程把大量盈利转给了税务部门和股票承销商。但是，似乎每个人都兴致勃勃，特别是承销商。
（译者注：近来银行股的配股与之类似。） More joy at AT&T
更有趣的AT&T
Encouraged by such success, some utilities have devised a further shortcut. In this case, the company declares the dividend, the shareholder pays the tax, and - presto - more shares are issued. No cash changes hands, although the spoilsport as always, persists in treating the transaction as if it had.
受到这些成功案例的鼓舞，一些公用事业公司发明了更方便的方法。公司宣布分红，股东交税，然后马上增发新股。虽然没有现金交易，但对股东的损害一如既往。
AT&T, for example, instituted a dividend-reinvestment program in 1973. This company, in fairness, must be described as very stockholder-minded, and its adoption of this program, considering the folkways of finance, must he regarded as totally understandable. But the substance of the program is out of Alice in Wonderland.
比如AT&T在1973年推出了一个以股代息计划。据说这家公司是非常关心股东利益的，考虑到金融界的风气，这种计划的实施是完全可以理解的，但这个计划的内容仿佛出自于《爱丽丝梦游仙境》。
（译者注：以股代息可使股东在毋须支付买卖费用或印花税的情况下增加其持股。） In 1976, AT&T paid $2.3 billion in cash dividends to about 2.9 million owners of its common stock. At the end of the year, 648,000 holders (up from 601,000 the previous year) reinvested $432 million (up from $327 million) in additional shaves supplied directly by the company. 1976年，AT&T向它的290万名普通股股东发放了23亿现金红利，该年年底，共有64.8万名股东（前一年是60.1万）在公司直接发行的增发股上再投资了4.32亿美元（前一年为3.27亿）。 Just for fun, let's assume that all AT&T shareholders ultimately sign up for this program. In that case, no cash at all would be mailed to shareholders - just as when Con Ed passed a dividend. However, each of the 2.9 million owners would be notified that he should pay income taxes on his share of the retained earnings that had that year been called a "dividend". Assuming that "dividends" totaled $2.3 billion, as in 1976, and that shareholders paid an average tax of 30 percent on these, they would end up, courtesy of this marvelous plan, paying nearly $730 million to the IRS. Imagine the joy of shareholders, in such circumstances, if the directors were then to double the dividend.
只是为了好玩，让我们假设所有的AT&T股东都参与了这项计划。如果是这样的话，股东们将看不到一分钱，而Con Ed公司至少还寄了一份股息过来。不仅如此，290万股东被要求为他们被保留在公司里的那份盈余支付所得税，因为在那一年，保留盈余被改名为“分红”。假设1976年的“股息”总额为23亿美元，股东们为此支付的所得税率平均为30%，为了这份不可思议的计划，他们最终将向税务机关支付约7.3亿美元。此情此景，想象一下，如果董事会决定将分红加倍，股东们会更高兴吗？
（译者注：美国以股代息还须支付印花储备?，?率为1.5%。国内上市公司的送股行为与之类似。） The government will try to do it We can expect to see more use of disguised payout reductions as business struggles with the problem of real capital accumulation. But throttling back shareholders somewhat will not entirely solve the problem. A combination of 7 percent inflation and 12 percent returns with reduce the stream of corporate capital available to finance real growth. And so, as conventional private capital-accumulation methods falter under inflation, our government will increasingly attempt to influence capital flows to industry, either unsuccessfully as in England or successfully as in Japan. The necessary cultural and historical underpinning for a Japanese-style enthusiastic partnership of government, business, and labor seems lacking here. if we are lucky, we will avoid following the English path, where all segments fight over division of the pie rather than pool their energies to enlarge it. On balance, however, it seems likely that we will hear a great deal more. as the years unfold about underinvestinent, stagflation, and the failures of the private sector to fulfill needs.
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发表于 2014-5-19 16:23:20
